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Infinity and the Logic of Non-Dualism 
Joseph A. Bracken, S.J. 
Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio 
WHETHER ULTIMATE REALITY is to 
be conceived as a personal God or an 
impersonal principle somehow at work in 
the world is an issue which tends to divide 
the major world religions into opposing 
camps. Furthermore, even within a given 
religion philosophers and theologians may 
differ on how God or Ultimate Reality is to 
be conceived. Within Vedantic Hinduism, 
for example, SaIikara and Ramanuja are 
clearly in opposition on this point even 
though they share the same basic world view 
in so many other respects. Likewise, 
Christian philosophers and theologians have 
through the centuries disagreed over this 
issue (e.g., the deeper reality of God in the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas and Meister 
Eckhart). At least one of the underlying 
philosophical issues, moreover, seems to be 
the question of infinity. If Ultimate Reality 
is truly transcendent or infinite, i.e., beyond 
human comprehension, then it cannot 
simultaneously be personal. For, to be a 
person would seem to involve being a 
relational and thus finite reality, one whose 
identity is fixed by relation to other persons. 
Ultimate Reality may indeed take on the 
appearance of personhood' for the religious 
devotee. But in itself it must be beyond the 
personal in order to remain infinite, in the 
words of the Chandogya Upanishad, "one 
without a second".l 
In this article I will first review the rival 
positions of Sailkara and Ramanuja on this 
point and then pass to a consideration of the 
thought of two contemporary Christian 
theologians, Robert Neville and myself, in ' 
recently published books. I will indicate how 
Neville's position bears some limited 
resemblance to that of Sailkara just as mine 
more closely resembles that of Ramanuja. In 
any event, my deeper purpose here will be 
first to illuminate the problem of attributing 
infinity to God or whatever else is 
considered to be Ultimate Reality and then, 
in setting forth my own position, to indicate 
how one might be able· to resolve that 
problem by reconceiving infinity as a non-
dual reality in a special sense, namely, as an 
immanent activity within entities rather than 
as some kind of entity in its own right. For, 
thus understood, it can be represented as 
something that is necessarily both itself and 
not itself at the same time. 
To begin, then, if one accepts the idea 
that Brahman is infinite, thatis, numerically 
"one without a second", then SaIikara 
appears to be right in maintaining that there 
must be two distinct standpoints with respect 
to knowledge of Brahman, namely, the 
absolute and the relative. "The supreme 
truth . is that Brahman is non-dual and 
relationless. It alone is; there is nothing real 
beside it. But from our standpoint, which is 
the empirical, relative standpoint, Brahman 
appears as God, the cause of the world.,,2 
Logically, nothing else can be the case if 
Brahman is infinite in' this sense. All 
multiplicity must be an illusion. For, if 
anything else besides Brahman really exists, 
by that very fact it renders Brahman finite, 
less than infinite. It is no longer "one 
without a second". The fact that this other 
entity is absolutely dependent upon Brahman 
for its existence and activity, as in Madhva's 
understanding of the God-world 
relationship,3 does p.ot alter the fact that it 
nevertheless exists apart from Brahman and 
thereby limits the alleged infinity of 
Brahman. It is something that Brahman is not. 
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Ramanuja's qualified non-dualism, to be 
sure, offers a response precisely to this line 
" of argument. Ramanuja, it will be 
remembered, argues that creatures really 
exist but only as part of Brahman, as the 
"body" of Brahman.4 Hence, their only 
reality is to be various finite manifestations 
of Brahman; in this sense, Brahman can still 
be regarded as "one without a second". 
Cogent as Ramanuja's argument may be at 
first reading, it still seems to me that there 
are logical problems associated with this 
soul-body analogy for the God-world 
relationship. For, on the one hand, if 
Brahman is the Inner Self or antarylimi of 
every created entity such that the entity is 
totally under the control of Brahman, then it 
would appear that that entity has no 
ontological independence of Brahman, no 
reality apart from Brahman. Ramanuja, for 
example, has the following definition of a 
body in his commentary on the Brahmli-
Sutras: "Any entity that a sentient being is 
able completely to control and support for 
its own purpose, and the essential nature of 
which is entirely subservient to that self, is 
its body". 5 But, given such a definition, the 
independent reality of the created entity is 
quite ambiguous. It appears to be simply a 
"mode" (priikiira) of the divine being; its 
only meaning or value is to be a finite~ 
manifestation of the transcendent reality of 
Brahman.6 
On the, other hand, if one argues that the 
created entity, e. g., an individual self, is 
sufficiently independent of Brahman to make 
its own decision in line with its specific 
karma or fate, albeit with the "permission" 
of Brahman,7 then the reality or ontological 
independence of the created entity is assured 
but Brahman is no longer "one without a 
second". It is rather one among many. Even 
though it is clearly the Highest Self, it is not 
the Absolute Self. For it shares existence 
with finite selves who likewise, at least to 
some extent, control their own existence and 
activity. Admittedly, these other entities are 
dependent upon Brahman for that same· 
existence and activity in that they constitute 
Brahman's "body." But, just as the human 
body and soul together make up the 
composite reality of an organism, so 
Brahman would seem to be only a part, 
though admittedly the controlling part, of 
the composite reality which is Brahman plus 
the world of Nature and of individual selves. 
It would seem, then, that, given the 
conventional understanding of Brahman as 
infinite, Sailkara presents the inore logical 
case. All appearances to the contrary not-
withstanding, there can be only one reality. 
Everything is Brahman; and Brahman itself 
is transpersonal, beyond the personal. For 
personhood is a relational concept. That is, 
as Martin Buber pointed out in his 
celebrated work I and Thou, I become a 
person in saying Thou to you as another 
person. Without a Thou, there is no personal 
I. 8 But this once again would imply that 
Brahman is not infinite, "one without a 
second". Relation to another "I" would 
render Brahman finite. 
One may counterargue, to be sure, that 
infinity when applied to the Hindu notion of 
Brahman or Western notions of God should 
be understood qualitatively not quantitative-
ly. That is, Brahman or God implies the 
qualitative fullness of being rather than a 
single all-comprehensive entity. Yet, even if 
Brahman, for example, is conventionally 
described as saccidlinanda (being, 
consciousness, bliss), i.e. more as a state of 
being than an entity, such a perfect state of 
being must somehow really exist; it must bee 
the de facto experience of Atman or the 
Supreme Self. Otherwise, the claim that 
saccidlinanda really exists could readily be 
dismissed as illusory, pure wish-fulfilment 
on the part of unhappy human beings. 
Similarly within the Christian tradition, 
while God is no doubt qualitatively superior 
to creatures, it does not follow that God is 
for that same reason infinite in the sense 
discussed above. ,For, as long as creatures 
exist who subjectively exercise some of the 
perfections objectively possessed by God, 
then God must be said to share existence 
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with these creatures and thus is not "one 
without a second". By their very existence, 
creatures limit the infinity of God even 
though they exist only as reflections of the 
divine being and perfection. 
Thus the distinction between qualitative 
and quantitative understandings of the 
infinite cannot be sustained under careful 
scrutiny. Logically, the qualitative 
understanding of the infinite has to be 
grounded in a quantitative understanding of 
the infinite as numerically "one without a 
second" . What is presupposed here, of 
course, is that the Infinite is somehow an 
entity: for Sailkara, the Absolute Self; for 
Ramanuja, the Highest Self; for Christian 
theologians, God as the Supreme Being. On 
the other hand, if the infinity of God or 
Brahman were rethought in strictly non-
entitative terms, namely, as the reality of an 
all-comprehensive activity, then the 
relationship between Brahman (or God) and 
finite entities might well be established on a 
new basis. 
What do I mean, however, by the term 
"an all-comprehensive activity"? My 
supposition is that entities exist both in 
themselves and in dynamic relation to one 
another only by virtue of an underlying 
activity which serves as the ontologi~al 
ground for their existence and activity. 9 
Every entity, accordingly, is dual-
dimensional. . There is its underlying 
ontological ground and its existence as an 
entity in virtue of that same ground. lO As 
I see it, this could well be the basis for a 
new understanding of the much controverted 
notion of non-duality in the Vedanta 
tradition. That is, non-duality does not exist 
in the first place between an infinite entity 
and finite entities, but rather between the 
grounding activity at work within an entity 
and the entity itself as an existing reality. 
For they are not simply identical; the 
grounding activity is not an entity, and the 
entity is other than the grounding activity. 
At the same time they are not-two since only 
together, namely, as grounding activity and 
that which exists in virtue of the grounding 
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activity, are they one concrete reality. 
This grounding activity, moreover, is 
infinite because it serves as the ontological 
ground for literally everything that exists. It 
is, accordingly, not limited by its activity in 
any single entity. Rather, it transcends them 
all since it is their common ground or 
source of existence and activity. Whereas 
entities are inevitably limited or defined by 
their relations to one another, this grounding 
activity is strictly unlimited and· therefore 
infinite since it has no rival. In the words of 
the Chandogya Upanishad, it is "one without 
a second". aut it is "one without a second" 
as an activity rather than as an entity. An 
infinite entity by definition eliminates the 
possibility of other entities besides itself 
which really exist. An infinite activity, on 
the contrary, only makes sense in terms of 
many entities in dynamic interrelation. The 
only reason for an infinite activity to exist 
is, in other words, to empower entities to 
exist both in themselves and in relation to 
one another as members of a common 
wodd. 11 
What I am arguing here, accordingly, is 
that a distinction should be made between 
Brahman and Atman within the Vedantic 
tradition and between the act of being and 
God in the Christian tradition. Brahman and 
its counterpart· in the Christian tradition, the 
act of being, are to be considered infinite 
because they are two names for one and the 
same ontological reality, namely, an 
underlying activity which brings into 
existence and relates to one another all the 
entities (both divine and creaturely) that 
exist. Atman, on the other hand, and the 
personal God of Christian belief represent 
the Supreme Being, that which possesses this 
activity by nature and which somehow 
shares it with all other beings. Thus, as I 
argue in The Divine Matrix, one can and 
should distinguish in the Vedantic tradition 
between the cosmic Self or supreme Atman, 
the atman of the individual finite self and 
Brahman as the underlying ontological 
activity common to them both which links 
them in an I-Thou relationship. 12 
3
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Similarly, in the Christian tradition, one 
should distinguish between God, the 
individual creature, and the act of being 
common to them both which links them as 
Creator and creature within a common 
world. 
In The Divine Matrix, I devoted a 
chapter to an analysis of the "Great 
Sayings" in the Upanishads and to a 
somewhat more detailed analysis of the 
writings of SaiIkara and Ramanuja, all in the 
light of this new understanding of the 
Infinite as an underlying activitr; rather than 
as a transcendent entity. 3 In the 
remaining pages of this article, accordingly, 
I will focus on the writings of two 
contemporary Christian theologians, namely, 
Robert Neville of Boston University and 
myself, in which this notion of the Infinite 
as an underlying activity rather than as a 
transcendent entity comes to the fore in the 
analysis of the God-world relationship from 
a Christian perspective. I will offer a brief 
summary of our two positions and then 
indicate how in a curious way we reflect the 
different stances taken by Sailkara and. 
Ramanuja on the reality of Brahman/Atman. 
In Behind the Masks of God, Neville 
argues that every entity is a "harmony" of 
essential and conditional features, i.e., of 
featur,es which distinguish it from other 
entities and of features which link it to other 
entities. 14 He then adds: Given the 
existence of two such entities, each with its 
own harmony of essential and conditional 
features, 
there must be an ontologial ground of 
mutual togetherness in which each with 
both essential and conditional features 
faces the other with both essential and 
conditional features. I propose that this 
ground is ontological creativity, 
creativity of the very being of all things 
insofar as they are together in any sense 
whatever. 15 
Finally, he also notes that ontological 
creativity "is the presence of the wholly 
transcendent God beyond God creating the 
determinate creatures of the earth but 
without determinate character of divinity 
apart from creating." 16 
This somewhat cryptic reference to God 
Neville spells out in a later book in the 
following manner. The doctrine of creation 
out of nothing (ex nihilo) has three 
components; the creative source, the creative 
act, and the created product. The created 
product is not only the world of finite 
entities but the determinate reality of God as 
their creator. God, in other words, moves 
from pure indeterminacy to determinate 
reality in creating the world. The creative 
act is the ontological creativity referred to 
above. Finally, the creative source is God as 
wholly indeterminate apart from creation. 
Neville's reasoning here is that, if God were 
a determinate reality apart from creation, 
then one would have to postulate still 
another reality beyond God which would 
provide the ontological reason for God's 
determinateness apart from creation. 
Ultimate reality, in other words, must be 
intrinsically indeterminate; for otherwise one 
is always faced with the question how it 
became determinate. 17 
Neville's conception of the God-world 
relationship is, accordingly, in some ways 
close to that of SaIikara. Neville argues that 
God· as creative source is purely 
indeterminate; in that respect, God as 
creative source is akin to SaIikara's notion of 
Brahman. Likewise, Neville argues that God 
is creator or a determinate reality only 
through interaction with creatures, somewhat 
the way that SaiIkara arg.ues that Brahman is 
manifest as ISvara (Lord) only in interaction 
with human beings in search of an 
explanation for the origin of reality. On the 
other hand, unlike Sailkara, Neville 
postulates the real existence of finite entities 
apart from Brahman as the indeterminate 
source of reality and, above all, the real 
existence of a universal grounding activity 
which he calls ontological creativity (as 
opposed to SaiIkara's more ambivalent 
position on the status and function of miiyii). 
My own position is certainly more in 
line with orthodox Christian theology and 
4




possibly more in line with the personalistic 
theism of Ramanuja. For I argue that the 
ontological creativity or grounding activity 
at work within and among the entities of this 
world does not emanate from a totally 
unknown source as Neville claims but from 
God in terms of the divine nature, that 
which makes God to be God, even apart 
from creation. Even God as a personal being 
or entitative reality, in other words, requires 
a grounding activity in order to exist; but 
this grounding activity, as I see it, is the 
divine nature. It is, so to speak, the hidden 
dimension of God just as the grounding 
activity is the hidden dimension of the being 
or entitative reality of every created entity. 
Thus, while Neville is correct in saying that 
only something indeterminate can explain 
what is determinate, that indeterminate 
reality is not completely unknown. It can be 
identified as the divine nature, that which, 
first of all, makes God to be God and then 
secondly, through the act of creation, that 
which makes all creatures both to be 
themselves and to exist in relation to one 
another and to God. 18 
The possible affinity of my scheme with 
the thought of Ramanuja consists in the fact 
that we both seem to be aiming at a 
panentheistic' understanding of the 
God-w~rld relationship. That is, we both 
believe that finite entities exist in God and 
through the power of God. This is what 
Ramanuja e~idently had in mind with the 
metaphor of the world as the "body" of 
God. Likewise, this is what I have in mind 
with the argument that creatures exist in and 
through participation in the divine nature or 
divine act of being. Where we differ, of 
course, is that for Ramanuja finite entities, 
at least from one perspective, have no 
reality except as "modes" or finite 
manifestations of Brahman or Vi~,!u; for me, 
on the other' hand, finite entities 
unambiguously have their own real existence 
and activity apart from God as a 
transcendent entity even as they depend on 
the divine nature for that same existence and 
activity. In my scheme, accordingly, finite 
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entities are less the "body" of God than co-
existent members of a cosmic society with 
God. The unity of the cosmic society, 
moreover, is not the unity of God as its 
transcendent member but the dynamic unity 
brought about by the divine nature as the 
underlying principle of existence and activity 
for all the members, God included. It is the 
unity of a specifically social reality rather 
than the unity of an individual entity as in 
Ramanuja's scheme. 
To sum up, then, the relationship 
between the Infinite and the finite would 
seem to be necessarily non-dual; somehow 
the Infinite must encompass the finite or it is 
not really infinite. This would seem to be 
the enduring insight which a Westerner like 
myself should gain from pondering the 
"Great Sayings" out of the Upanishads and 
the writings of SaIikara and Ramanuja. What 
this paper, on the other hand, has argued is 
that there are two distinct options for what 
one means here by the' Infinite. If the 
Infinite is understood in quasi-entitative 
terms, then the position of SaIikara would 
seem to be logically more consistent than 
that of either Ramanuja or various Christian 
theologians like Neville or myself. Because, 
if an infinite entity is truly "one without a 
second", then multiplicity is an illusion. All 
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, 
only Brahman really exists. 
But, if the Infinite is understood to be an 
all-comprehensive activity such as Neville 
and I have urged, then finite entities really 
. exist and, at least within my scheme, a 
personal God in dynamic interaction with 
these finite entities really exists. The 
governing idea here is that there is a non-
dual relationship between a universal 
grounding activity called creativity and the 
entities which it thereby empowers to exist. 
Both the grounding activity and the entities 
really exist unlike the non-dual relationship, 
first, within Sailkara's scheme between the 
Absolute Self and ,finite entities in which 
finite entities ultimately do not exist and 
then within Ramanuja's scheme in which the 
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Visnu remains somewhat ambiguous. One 
can, in other words, equivalently "have 
one's cake and eat it too". Both the Infinite 
and the finite can be seen as real without 
logical contradiction. Neither is ultimately 
illusory. 19 
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